Is Iran’s “Revolution” Over: Wither ‘Hotdog’ Diplomacy?

Whether you agree that successful revolutions have three phases as  Strafor believes or move through more or less  is of little moment. What is important is that Stratfor. a skilled private analyst group and others with knowledge and historical perspective see things in Iran similarly. This is my version of those developments as they stand today.

THINGS ON THE STREETS. Revolution succeed with a strategically located vocal, single or limited segment of society begins to express resentment, taking to the streets of a major city, usually the capital. This segment is joined by others in the city and by segments elsewhere. The  demonstrations spreads becomes more disruptive and even violent. As resistance to the regime spreads, the regime deploys force. Those forces, drawn from resisting social segments and isolated from the rest of society, turn on the regime, and stop following the regime’s orders. This is what happened to the Shah of Iran in 1979; it is also what happened in Russia in 1917 or in Romania in 1989 and elsewhere.

Revolutions fail when no one joins that initial bunch, and they find themselves isolated. When the demonstrations do not spread they either peter out or the regime brings in the security and military forces-who frequently are hostile to the demonstrators-and use force to suppress the rising to the extent necessary. This is what happened in Tiananmen Square in China. The students who rose up were not joined by any others. and were crushed.

That is what is happening in Iran this week. The global media, obsessively focused on the initial demonstrators have repeatedly focused  on supporters of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s opponents because he is a acerbic stinker. But, they failed to notice that the demonstrations primarily consisted of the same type of people demonstrating. Amid the breathless reporting on the demonstrations, reporters failed to notice that the uprising was not spreading. They constantly interviewed English-speaking demonstrators, armed with smartphones or those little pen cameras supplied by a Southern California Iranian media outlet. The media did not recognize the signs of a failing revolution.

THE THEOCRACY. The Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke Friday and called out the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, they failed to understand that the troops-definitely not drawn from what we might call the “Twittering classes,” would remain loyal to the regime for ideological and social reasons.

The troops are unsympathic to the demonstrators as a small-town boy might be to a Harvard postdoc. So  reporters have deluded themselves into thinking they were witnessing a general uprising. But this was not St. Petersburg in 1917 or Bucharest in 1989-it was Tiananmen Square.

CONFUSION AND WISHFUL THINKING. Outside Iran there is  confusion about basic facts. For example, it is said that the urban-rural distinction in Iran is not critical any longer. that implies Iran is homogeneous and the demonstrators are represent all Iranians that is patently false.. But the social difference between someone living in a small towns and someone living in Tehran are enormous. When I worked in Boston and new York folks were fond of looking down their noses at the great unwashed to the west of Subury and the Hudson respectively.

Tehran proper has about 8 million inhabitants; its suburbs bring it to about 13 million people out of Iran’s total population of 70.5 million. or about 20 percent of Iran. Add in all other urbans center populations and you still havea great minority..  Inferences of social similarities between cities with 100,000 and 5 million are specious.  

Almost certainly vote fraud occurred, but, Ahmadinejad likely would have won without it. JFK beat Richard Nixon by less that a vote per precinct but tens of thousand of missing votes in Chicago carried the day. Nobody rioted, and Nixon when told the election was stolen refused to sue. Saying that would hurt the nation.

ELECTION NUMBERS.There are many questions including the speed of the vote count has been taken as a sign of fraud, as it should have been impossible to count votes that fast. Here are the numbers.

• 1. The polls closed at 7 p.m. but voting hours were extended until 10 p.m. in some place. sn line.
• 2. By 11:45 p.m. about 20 percent of the vote had been counted.
• 3. By 5:20 a.m. the next day, with almost all votes counted,
• 4. the election commission declared Ahmadinejad the winner.

The vote count thus took about seven hours about the same time it took in the U. S. in 2005, though reformists that claimed fraud back then did not stress the counting time in their allegations.

Iran has 47,000 voting stations, plus 14,000 roaming stations that travel from tiny village to tiny village, staying there for a short time before moving on. That creates 61,000 ballot boxes designed to receive roughly the same number of votes. That means each station would have been counting about 500 ballots, or about 70 votes per hour. With counting beginning at 10 p.m., So, they could easily have done it.

Some of the candidates didn’t even carry their own provinces or districts. Al Gore didn’t carry Tennessee in 2000. Ralph Nader didn’t carry his home precinct an effect probably felt by the two smaller candidates in the Iranian election.

Mousavi didn’t carry his own province is more interesting. Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett writing in Politico make some interesting points on this. As an ethnic Azeri, it was assumed that Mousavi would carry his Azeri-named and -dominated home province. But they also point out that Ahmadinejad also speaks Azeri, and made multiple campaign appearances in the district. They also point out that Khamenei is Azeri. In sum, winning that district was by no means certain for Mousavi, so losing it does not automatically signal fraud. It raised suspicions, but by no means was a smoking gun.

Almost certainly fraud occurred it does in every election. But, the fact is that Ahmadinejad’s vote in 2009 was extremely close to his victory percentage in 2005.

NEXT PHASE. Critically the protesters have not joined by any of the tens of millions whose votes the protesters alleged were stolen. Why? In a complete hijacking of the election by some 13 million votes by an extremely unpopular candidate, you would expect all hell would break loose. But, it hasn’t.   The demonstrations are actually comprised a small fraction of society.

Certainly  there are  tremendous tensions within the Iranian political elite. That no revolution broke out does not mean there isn’t a crisis in the political elite, particularly among the clerics. But that crisis does not cut the way Western common sense would have it. Many of Iran’s religious leaders see Ahmadinejad as hostile to their interests, threatening their financial prerogatives, and as taking international risks they don’t want to take. Ahmadinejad’s political popularity in fact rests on his populist hostility to what he sees as the corruption of the clerics and their families and his strong stand on Iranian national security issues.  Let’s face It the Persians are a proud, tough bunch.

In fact the clerics are divided but, many wanted Ahmadinejad to lose to protect their own sweet heart deals - fancy homes, lots of bucks and perks and no accountability.

MEDIA MISH MASH. Western media misunderstood all this because they didn’t understand that Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them, that many of the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous pull in the country’s security apparatus.

Why? Because Western media bought into the concept of the stolen election, therefore they saw Ahmadinejad’s support and the widespread dissatisfaction with the old clerical elite. The Western media simply didn’t understand or care that the most traditional and pious segments of Iranian society support Ahmadinejad because he opposes the old ruling elite. Instead, they assumed this was like Prague or Budapest in 1989, with a broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular regime.

Tehran in 2009, however, was a struggle between two main factions, both of which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the process. And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses and many Iranians agree with him.And there also was the small faction the BBC and CNN kept focusing on-the demonstrators in the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic. This faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in various ways, however. Ahmadinejad used it to make his case that the clerics who supported them, like Rafsanjani, would risk the revolution and play into the hands of the Americans and British to protect their own wealth. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani argued behind the scenes that the unrest was the tip of the iceberg, and that Ahmadinejad had to be replaced. Khamenei, an astute politician, examined the data and supported Ahmadinejad.

Now, as we saw after Tiananmen Square, we will see a reshuffling among the elite. Those who backed Mousavi will be on the defensive. By contrast, those who supported Ahmadinejad are in a powerful position. There is a massive crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite. Having been forced by the election and Khamenei to live with Ahmadinejad, some will make deals while some will fight-but Ahmadinejad is well-positioned to win this battle.

HOTDOG DIPLOMACY. Wednesday Khamenei was resolute in supporting the election outcome. Demonstrations are clearly being suppressed. Whether a general strike will be effective will be telling. If not the so-called “revolution” is ended. Optimism is waning. Obama has not disinvited Iranian diplomats to attend 4^th of July celebrations at American embassies around the world. That is another confusing signal. What impact, if any this “hotdog diplomacy” remains to be seen.

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